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A Unified Test for the Copyright Protection of the
User Interface to Computer Programs
Copyright protection for the literal aspects1 of computer
software has been accepted for many years.2 However, due to new
and emerging computer technologies, along with the rise in popu-
larity of the personal computer ("PC"), a new set of copyright is-
sues has emerged. A dominant theme in a number of recent cases
has shifted from claims of infringement through the copying of
program structures' or computer source code' to the copying of
non-literal aspects of the program. The court's opinion in the 1992
decision of Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.
provides a good summary of the confusion and concerns with re-
1. Copyright protection, as defined in the Copyright Act of 1976, "subsists, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression... from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1991). While works of authorship include such things
as literary works, musical works, motion pictures and sound recordings, they do not include
ideas, processes, procedures, systems, etc. Id. Therefore, a copyright can be thought of as
protecting the expression of an idea and not protecting the underlying idea itself. The literal
aspects of a computer program include such aspects as the source code of the program.
Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990).
2. Computer Assoc. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
3. When a computer program is first conceptualized, the programmer will often cre-
ate a flowchart that defines the logical flow that the computer program will follow. From
this flowchart the programmer will start to define discrete modules that will be used to
create the program. These discrete modules, when tied together, create the program struc-
ture. Program efficiency often depends upon this program structure. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987).
4. Congress has defined a computer program as "a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Computer source code is defined as a computer program written in
some high level computer language such as COBOL, FORTRAN or "C." Lotus v. Paper-
back, 740 F. Supp. at 44. A high level computer language is a set of statements or instruc-
tions that permits a programmer to describe in English-like syntax the steps that are re-
quired to bring about a certain result. By using a source code compiler, the English-like
syntax is converted into a set of instructions that the computer can understand. These in-
structions are collectively called "object code." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230-31.
5. The non-literal aspects of the computer program include the user interface and
the program's general "look and feel." The user interface is made up of the computer moni-
tor's visual display along with the user's ability to enter commands from an attached key-
board or alternative input device. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp.
1006, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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spect to copyrightability of the non-literal aspect of computer pro-
grams in general.6 The court stated:
To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for non-literal
program structure are not completely clear. We trust that as future cases
are decided, those limits will become better defined. Indeed, it may well be
that the Copyright Act 7 serves as a relatively weak barrier against public
access to the theoretical interstices behind a program's source and object
codes.8 This results from the hybrid nature of a computer program, which,
while it is literary expression, is also a highly functional, utilitarian compo-
nent in the larger process of computing.
Generally, we think that copyright registration-with its indiscriminating
availability-is not ideally suited to deal with the highly dynamic technol-
ogy of computer science."
Two cases decided in 1992 demonstrate the attitude of the
courts and seem to mark the direction of future cases involving the
copying of computer program user interfaces. In the first case, Lo-
tus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,10 the de-
fendant copied the user interface to the plaintiffs program, Lotus
1-2-3.11 While the case differed from earlier cases involving the
copying of the user interface to Lotus 1-2-3, in that the user inter-
face in only one segment of Borland's program was similar to the
Lotus 1-2-3 user interface, the similarity was sufficient for Lotus'
copyright to be infringed. In this case, the court found the Lotus 1-
2-3 interface to be "expressive" and not functional and therefore,
copyrightable.12
The second case marking the direction of future copyright cases
was Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp."3 In Apple, the court
limited the scope of copyright protection for user interfaces where
the elements of the user interface can only be expressed in a lim-
ited number of ways or where the expression of the idea has
"merged" with the idea itself."'
6. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 702.
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
8. See note 4 and accompanying text.
9. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 712.
10. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992). See notes 58-62.
11. Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 205. Lotus 1-2-3 is a "spreadsheet" computer
program that was originally designed for the DOS PC. A spreadsheet program allows the
user to organize data of different types into rows and columns. Once the data has been
organized, the program can then be used to perform calculations on the rows and columns.
An example of how a spreadsheet program might be used is to create a simple ledger for a
business.
12. Id. at 219.
13. 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
14. Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
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In deciding these cases, the courts appear to have contradicted a
number of older decisions."' In addition, the recent decisions may
appear even to be contradictory among themselves. However, to-
gether, both the older and recent decisions can be used to synthe-
size and chart a clear, concise, rational and unified test for decid-
ing future non-literal computer software copyright infringement
cases.
BACKGROUND
In 1981, International Business Machines, Inc. ("IBM") intro-
duced the first IBM PC computer ("DOS PC"). In 1984, Apple
Computer, Inc. introduced its first version of the Apple Macintosh
computer ("MAC"). The MAC and DOS PC were each unique in
their designs. The MAC is a "graphical user interface" ("GUI")
based system" with bitmap graphics." The characteristic windows,
menus and icons make up what Apple terms as its "desktop meta-
phor." The philosophy of the "desktop metaphor" is to present the
user with many of the items and actions that a user would find or
do at the user's desk. While the "desktop metaphor" was viewed
by Apple as new and unique, the vast majority of its ideas
originated in earlier "GUI" based systems."'
The DOS PC was originally and is in many cases today best de-
scribed as a "character based interface" system."' The "character
15. See Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). The Digital Communications court stated:
Therefore, it is this court's opinion that a computer program's copyright protection
does not extend to the program's screen displays and that copying of a program's
screen displays, without evidence of copying of the program's source code, object
code, sequence, organization or structure, does not state a claim of infringement.
Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
16. The best description of a "GUI" based system was provided by the Apple court
when describing the Apple Macintosh's "GUI":
[S]creen displays include icons or symbols to represent programs or information, pull
down menus or lists of commands or information, use of windows to display informa-
tion and the ability to move, re-size, open or close those windows to retrieve, put
away or modify information, and a display of text by a proportionally spaced font in
all menu items, title bars, icon names and text directories for a consistent and dis-
tinctive appearance.
Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1017.
17. Bitmap graphics are composed of dots on the computer monitor. These dots are
commonly referred to as pixels and can be colored or shaded to create complex patterns. Id.
at 1018.
18. Id. at 1017. Such early "GUI" based systems included systems developed by
Xerox, Perq and Apollo Computer Corp. Id. at 1024.
19. The best description of a "character based interface" system was provided by the
court in Apple:
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based interface" is a common characteristic of most "multi-user
computers"2 used in the industry today. Not until the recent rise
in popularity of Microsoft Windows version 3.021 and the availabil-
ity of more advanced graphics, could the DOS PC be characterized
to embody the most distinctive features that the MAC provides.
While the appearance and functionality of the MAC and DOS
PC differ greatly, they have four common features. First, the two
are priced so that the consumer can reasonably purchase either
one.2 2 Second, the computers have sufficient processing power to
provide for practical use.2 3 Third, each computer has the same ba-
sic design.2" Lastly, each computer has a powerful graphic sub-
system.
2
Programs written for computers having only limited amounts of such memory are
forced to base their visual displays on vertically or horizontally defined lines . . .
[s]uch a visual interface is generally termed an alphanumeric or character based in-
terface and lacks the ability to generate the more complex shapes, forms, artistry and
animation associated with a graphical user interface. See note 16. A user wanting to
start a word processing application, for example, in an alphanumeric or character-
based interface might type the command "Exec WS" or to create a new file might
type "Dup. F. Txt".
Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1018.
20. A "multi-user" computer is a computer which more than one user shares the
computer's central processing unit ("CPU") simultaneously. The CPU "contains the elec-
tronic circuits that control the computer and perform the arithmetic and logical functions".
Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 43. On most "multi-user" computers, the users interact
with the computer by a computer terminal, which is comprised of a computer display and a
keyboard. A computer terminal is in turn attached to the computer by an electrical cable
that is used to transmit data between the computer and the terminal.
21. Microsoft Windows version 3.0 is a computer program that is run on a DOS PC
and "extends its visual and graphical capabilities" of the computer beyond that of a "char-
acter based interface" system. Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1019.
22. A typical DOS PC or MAC can be purchased for less than two thousand dollars.
23. As an example, a reasonably configured DOS PC or MAC sold today is capable of
easily manipulating (adding, deleting, moving and copying) text and graphics within a docu-
ment of hundreds of pages using a word processing package.
24. The court in Lotus v. Paperback provided a good overview of the design of a DOS
PC and a MAC:
A personal computer consists of hardware and software. The hardware includes the
central processing unit ("CPU"), which contains the electronic circuits that control
the computer and perform the arithmetic and logical functions, the internal memory
of the computer ("random access memory," or "RAM"), input devices such as a key-
board and mouse, output devices such as a display screen and printer, and storage
devices such as hard and floppy disk drives.
Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 43.
25. Graphics on the DOS PC and the MAC are performed using a separate CPU and
RAM than that of the computer itself. Therefore the computer's main CPU is not burdened
with performing the calculations required to display information and graphics on the com-
puter display screen. The graphic CPU is dedicated to performing graphic.a-related calcula-
tiong and is optimized to perform these calculations very efficiently. This also leads to faster
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Along with the above mentioned features, software developed for
these computers is unique (as compared to software developed for
multi-user computer systems), due to both the targeted user of the
computer 2  and the power of the computer processor and the
graphics.2 7 One of the important differentiating features found in
software developed for DOS PCs and MACs is the emphasis on
ease of use. Ease of use is most often accomplished through the
development of good user interfaces.
28
What makes a user interface "good" depends upon a number of
factors and can be accomplished in many ways. At its most basic
level, a good user interface is one that permits a user to perform
the desired functions found in the computer software package with
a minimum of effort. The mark of a good user interface is that the
functionality 29 and operation of the computer software package is
intuitive. When a program is developed that has a good user inter-
face, fills a need of users and is successful, the user interface is as
valuable and likely accounts as much for the success of the product
as the underlying structure of the software. Many computer
software packages today may match functionality with their com-
petition, but a package's success or reputation is due to its user
interface.30 Therefore, copyright protection that is limited to pro-
tecting the structure or literal elements of the software, protects
little if the user interface is left open to unchecked copying.
display of graphics.
26. As indicated by the name, the DOS PC was designed for "personal" use. Clearly,
whether used in the business environment or in the home, the computer was designed for
use by persons who did not have formal computer training.
27. Even though multi-user computer systems are generally more powerful than DOS
PCs, since the CPU is shared among multiple simultaneous users, each user has less proces-
sor resources than the DOS PC user.
28. A user interface is the combination of the "computer monitor's visual displays
and the user command functions on the keyboard or other input devices." Apple, 799 F.
Supp. at 1017.
29. The functionality of a computer software program refers to the capabilities. For
example, basic functionality within a word processing package would include adding, delet-
ing, moving or copying text or graphics within a document.
30. This is evidenced by the fact that computer software developers have sued to
prevent competitors from copying their user interfaces. See Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp.
at 203 (holding that the owner of a software program infringed the competitor's user inter-
face program by taking expressive, nonfunctional elements of menu commands, menu com-
mand structure, macro language, and key stroke consequences). See also Lotus v. Paper-
back, 740 F. Supp. at 37 (holding that the menu command structure of computer
spreadsheet program, including the choice of command terms, structure and order of those





In the 1978 decision of Synercom Technology v. University
Computer Co.,3 ' the court determined that federal copyright pro-
tection covers only the literal aspects of the program and not non-
literal aspects, such as the user interface.3" The Synercom decision
represents the early view of the courts and is prevalent in other
cases that appeared through the 1980s.
The 1986 decision of Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labo-
ratory, Inc.,33 departed from Synercom by stating that non-literal
aspects of a computer program are covered by copyright protec-
tion, but stopped short of providing coverage for the user interface
of a computer program.-3 Whelan separated copyright coverage for
audiovisual works (and by inference for user interfaces) and re-
quired a second copyright.3 5
Applying the Whelan decision, the court in Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World" determined that copyright pro-
tection not only covers the literal elements of the computer pro-
gram, but also non-literal elements including audiovisual dis-
plays. 37 In this case, the defendant created a graphics art package
that was directly derived from the plaintiff's program.3 8 The de-
fendant had started to develop the program using the plaintiff's
program as a model." Only in the later stages of program develop-
ment, when negotiations to license the user interface failed, did the
defendant stop using the plaintiff's program as a model.40 In the
end, many aspects of the defendant's user interface looked identi-
31. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
32. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014.
33. 797 F.2d 1222.
34. Id. at 1234. The case involved the creation of a computer program by the defend-
ant's copying of the structure and overall organization of the plaintiff's program. The de-
fendant had a copy of the source code for the plaintiff's program. Id. at 1232.
35. Id. at 1244. The court stated that "screen outputs are completely irrelevant to the
question whether the copyright in the program has been infringed. Rather the only conclu-
sion to be drawn from the fact of the different copyrights is that the screen output cannot
be direct evidence of copyright infringement." Id.
36. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
37. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133. The defendant created a computer programq by
copying the user interface of the plaintiff's program. Id. at 1130-31. The defendant had a
copy of the plaintiff's program on which to model his program. Id.
38. Id.




cal to the plaintiff's user interface."' The court determined that the
defendant's program was substantially similar and thus infringed
upon the plaintiff's copyright.42
In the 1987 of decision Digital Communications Associates v.
Softklone Distributing Corp.,"5 the plaintiff created a computer
program that was used to transfer data between computers." The
program embodied a distinctive and well received "status screen"
that displayed various "program settings or parameters" that the
user could modify.'5 While the court in Digital Communications
agreed that the copyright protection granted to a computer pro-
gram encompassed more than the literal aspect of the program, the
court decided that the screen displays created by the program were
not protected.46 The only situation in which a program's screen
display would be protected would be if there existed evidence of
copying of the programs source code, object code, sequence, organi-
zation or structure. 47 The Digital Communications decision is sig-
nificant because the court specifically cited and criticized the
Broderbund case. The court stated that the conclusion in
Broderbund, that a copyright of the program extended to cover the
user interface aspect of the computer program, was incorrect and
an overly broad construction of Whelan."
The plaintiff in Digital Communications had obtained a sepa-
rate copyright for the status screens in its program, in addition to
the copyright it obtained for the literal aspects of the software. 9
The court, in a decision that is compatible with Whelan, ulti-
mately determined that the second copyright of the status screen
was valid and enforceable.5 e The court found that copying of the
41. Id.
42. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1138.
43. 659 F. Supp. 449.
44. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 452.
45. Id. A program setting or parameter is a variable within the software that can be
set to a specific value. For example, within a word processing application an example of a
program settings that the user can modify is a line spacing setting. On a typical word
processing application, if the user wanted to double space a document, the user would mod-
ify the setting to the value specified by the software developer that represents double
spacing.
46. Id. at 455. The court stated that "copyright protection of a computer program
extends beyond a program's literal source or object code to its structure, sequence and or-
ganization." Id.
47. Id. at 456. Specifically, the court stated that the conclusion in Broderbund was
"an over-expansive and erroneous reading of Whelan." Id.
48. Id. at 455. See also Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133.
49. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 456.
50. Id. at 456. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the status screen
1993
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status screen was demonstrated by substantial similarity and that
the defendant's status screen had captured the "total concept and
feel" of the plaintiff's status screen. 1
In 1990, Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Inter-
national5" was decided. Paperback Software marketed a software
package that, by design, had a user interface that was similar to
the interface of Lotus 1-2-3. 51 The court determined that the Lotus
1-2-3 user interface was a copyrightable expression.5' The court
stated that it is important not to draw the lines between copyright-
able and non-copyrightable expressions too narrowly so as to "ig-
nore the accommodation struck by Congress in choosing to ad-
vance the public welfare by rewarding authors,' 5 5 or to draw the
lines too broad so as to "bestow strong monopolies over specific
applications." 6 The court refuted the determinations of the Whe-
lan and Digital courts that a separate copyright is required for
screen displays.
5 7
was a necessary expression of the idea and that status screens amount to an uncopyrightable
blank form, stating:
If there are "various means [to] achiev[e] the 'desired purpose', then the particular means
chosen is not necessary to the purpose. . . ." Id. at 458 (citations omitted). If there is only
one means, then the means merges with the idea and that precludes copyright protection.
Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
As a general proposition, a blank form is not copyrightable. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879). The court determined that "if the work provides the user information beyond simply
indicating where to record data then the work is copyrightable." Digital Communications,
659 F. Supp. at 462. Even when a screen is copyrighted, the copyright is still only limited to
the arrangement and design of the screen and does not control over the ideas of the pro-
gram, status screen or the particular "command terms or symbols" used within the software.
Id.
51. Id. at 465.
52. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
53. Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 68-69. In actuality, the defendant had copied
the user interface of Lotus 1-2-3, feeling that the success of its product required that it have
a similar user interface to that of Lotus 1-2-3. Id. at 69.
54. Id. at 68. The court stated:
I conclude that the user interface and some other non-literal aspects of computer
programs are not merely articles "having an intrinsic utilitarian function." When
computer programs include elements - both literal and non-literal - "that can be
identified separately from and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian
aspects of the article," they are potentially copyrightable.
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 53.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 79-80. The court decided that the copyright of the entire work is sufficient
to protect the "screen displays." The court then explained that the copyright office instructs
authors to register on a single application form for a single work using the application form
"in the class most appropriate to the type of authorship that predominated in the work
being registered." Id. at 81.
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In Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International,
Inc. ,68 the defendant was found to have copied the user interface of
the plaintiff's program .5 This case differed from the earlier Lotus
case in that Borland's product had numerous user interfaces from
which the user could chooseY' If the user was accustomed to using
the Lotus 1-2-3 interface, the user could use the defendant's pro-
gram in a mode that presented a user interface similar to the one
found in Lotus 1-2-3.61 Therefore, only one aspect of the defend-
ant's user interface was copied. In this case, the court made only a
cursory exploration into the possibility that the user interface was
not copyrightable, rejecting the defendant's contention that user
interface was not copyrightable because it was not fixed in a tangi-
ble medium.2
The most recent case to address user interface issues is Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation.3 In Apple, the district
court failed to discuss the possibility that the user interface was
separate or not copyrightable. The court also appeared to accept
the proposition that the copyright of the computer program en-
compassed the user interface and screen displays. Additionally, the
court limited the scope of copyright protection for user interfaces
where the elements of the user interface can only be expressed in a
limited number of ways or where the expression of the idea had
"merged" with the idea itself. "
From the cases cited above, it is clear that the attitude of the
courts has changed dramatically. Early cases demonstrated the at-
titude that copyright protection was very narrow and covered only
literal infringement of the copyrighted work. Recent decisions have
been directly opposed to the earlier cases and demonstrate the
courts' realization that when copyright statutes are read narrowly,
58. 799 F. Supp. 203.
59. Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 223.
60. Id. at 205-06.
61. Id. at 205. The court determined that Borland had not copied the entire Lotus 1-
2-3 interface, it had copied parts of the interface. Id.
62. Id. at 208-09. The court stated:
All that is required in this regard is that the expression be embodied in a copy "by or
under the authority of the author" in a form "sufficiently stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced,or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transi-
tory duration."... The output of a computer program, at least insofar as it is typical
of the program, predictable from it, and directed by the operation of the program,
satisfies these requirements.
Id. (citation omitted). -
63. 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
64. Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
1993
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valuable non-literal elements of the software (such as the user in-
terface) are left open to copying. It appears that the courts realize
that these non-literal elements are as valuable, if not more valua-
ble, than the program code and structure itself and, therefore, war-
rant protection.
BARS TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Prior to discussing the various tests used by the courts to deter-
mine copyright infringement, a number of bars to copyright should
be discussed. Each bar acts to prevent the copyright of an idea,
that would otherwise be copyrightable. The concepts of "merger,"
''scenes a faire,' ''functionality," and "lack of originality" are all
bars. While a number of other courts have discussed these con-
cepts, the Apple court provided the best insight into each.
"Merger," simply stated, "means that there is practically only
one way to express an idea."6 Merger does not preclude copyright
protection where there is "more than one avenue of expression
available," but when "technical or conceptual constraints limit the
available ways to express an idea," then copyright protection will
not be available.6 For example, the MAC can run multiple appli-
cations at one time. Each application displays its information to
the user in a separate window.6 7 Each of the windows displayed
could partially or completely overlap the other windows. The Ap-
ple court determined that Apple could not copyright such window
actions because there were conceivably two ways to display multi-
ple programs on the screen. 8
Scenes a faire "originated in stock characters and features of
dramatic works, . . . and now encompasses stereotyped expression,
standards or common features in a wide variety of works, including
audiovisual works generated by computers. e69 Building on the ex-
ample used to describe the concept of "merger," the court in Apple
determined that "scenes a faire" prevented copyright protection
for the action of bringing a window to the forefront when it is se-
65. Id. at 1021.
66. Id.
67. A window is defined as "an area of the screen with visible boundaries through
which information is displayed". The windows can be of any size up to the physical size of
the computer video screen, with one window either partially or completely overlapping an-
other. JON PEDDIE, GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACES AND GRAPHICAL STANDARDS 258 (1992).
68. Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1027-31.
69. Id. at 1021.
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lected by the user.70 The basis of the court's decision was that
bringing the "active window" to the forefront is a very general and
abstract concept and serves a utilitarian purpose of preventing ac-
cidental input.
71
Copyright protection covers expressions of ideas, not the under-
lying ideas themselves. 2 If an expression of an idea is itself func-
tional, then the expression may not be protected by copyright.
7 3 If
the expression of an idea is tightly tied to the idea itself so that to
copyright the expression would have the effect to foreclose the use
of the idea by others, then the expression cannot be copyrighted.
Only where "artistic features" can be identified, separated from
and exist separately as "a work of art" can the "artistic features"
(expressions) be copyrighted.74
Lack of originality is also a bar to copyrightability.7 1 Where a
work embodies previous expressions, the work's copyright does not
extend to cover the expressions. If an expression of an idea was
created in the past and was not copyrighted, then the original au-
thor has chosen to place the expression in the public domain. Once
in the public domain, the expression is available for free use by
others. In Apple, the main attributes that Apple was trying to pro-
tect were found in computer systems that were developed much
earlier.7" In such cases, it would be contrary to the Copyright Act
to permit copyright protection if the work was not original.
RULES GOVERNING COPYRIGHTABILITY AND INFRINGEMENT
Courts have differed greatly regarding the appropriate tests to
70. Id. at 1033.
71. Id. at 1032-33. An active window is the window with which the user is currently
interacting. This is the window that receives the characters. PEDDIE, cited at note 67, at 246.
72. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 567 (1993). Copyright never
precludes a person from using an idea. Copyright rather protects an author's expression of
that idea. While computer programs are generally expressions of ideas, the ideas, processes
or methods that the programmer is trying to capture in the program are not copyrightable.
Id.
73. Apple, 799 F. Supp. 1021. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act'of 1976 states that
"[iln no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, re-
gardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
74. See Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1023.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states,
"[clopyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of author-
ship .... ." Id.
76. Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1024.
1993
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apply to copyright cases involving copyrightability and infringe-
ment of non-literal elements of a computer program. At this time,
there is no clear indication as to the adoption of a single test in
either case.
In Digital Communications, the court determined that a two-
step test should be used to determine substantial similarity (and
thus copyright infringement). The test first requires that the
court apply an "extrinsic" test.7 8 The extrinsic test is designed to
determine whether the underlying ideas are substantially similar.7 9
The court must next apply the "intrinsic" test to determine
whether there is substantial similarity of the expressions."0 While
the test is straightforward and simple, one serious problem is ap-
parent. The Whelan court determined that the intrinsic portion of
the test was ill suited for determining infringement in computer
software cases because of the complexity of computer programs.81
More specifically, the problem occurs when applying the extrinsic/
intrinsic test to situations where copyrightable and non-copyright-
able expressions are intertwined. The test does not accommodate
the isolation and removal of the unprotected expression from the
work being tested.
The court in Digital Communications also interjected the idea of
a "concept and feel" test.82 This test is simply the intrinsic portion
of the extrinsic/intrinsic test and has been criticized.88
The court developed a three-part test to determine copyright-
77. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 464-65.
78. Id. at 465.
79. Id. The court in Broderbund stated that to prove similarity under the extrinsic
test, "[a]nalytic dissection and expert testimony" are required. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at
1136.
80. Digital Communication, 659 F. Supp at 465. The court in Broderbund states that
the intrinsic test "consists solely of the response of the 'ordinary reasonable person'."
Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1137.
81. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233. The court stated:
[W]e believe that the ordinary observer test is not useful and is potentially mislead-
ing when the subjects of the copyright are particularly complex, such as computer
programs. We therefore join the growing number of courts which do not apply the
ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving exceptionally difficult material,
like computer programs, but instead adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry ac-
cording to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible.
Id.
82. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 465.
83. See Apple, 799 F. Supp. at 1020 n.11. "The court does not believe that the Data
East panel's reference to 'total concept and feel' is an endorsement of Apple's expansive




ability " in Lotus v. Paperback Software 85 and Lotus v. Borland.8 6
The first step is to distinguish between an idea and the expression
of this idea. The second step is to determine whether the expres-
sion includes non-essential elements. Finally, the analysis must de-
termine whether the non-essential elements are part of a copy-
rightable work.
.Applying this test, the fact finder in essence would extract those
expressions that are "functional" and thus not copyrightable. In
theory, once extracted, all that is left is expression that is poten-
tially copyrightable. The problem with this test is that it fails to
remove those expressions that are uncopyrightable due to
"merger", "scenes a faire", and "lack of originality."
In Computer Associates, the court formulated another three-
step procedure that combines both the tests for copyrightability
and substantial similarity in situations involving non-literal copy-
ing.8 7 The first step in the process is called the "abstraction" step,
in which the court dissects the program down into its "constituent
structural parts."8 " The second step is called "filtration" and en-
tails the examination of the "structural components at each level
84. Lotus v. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 60. See Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at
211, where the court enunciated the test as follows:
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker must
focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive, along
the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particularized, and choose
some formulation, some conception of the "idea," "system," "process," "procedure,"
or "method" - for the purpose of distinguishing between the idea, system, process,
procedure, or method and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression of the
idea, system, process, procedure, or method is limited to elements essential to expres-
sion of that idea, system, process, procedure, or method ... or instead includes iden-
tifiable elements of expression not essential to every expression of that idea, system,
process, procedure, or method.
THIRD, having identified elements of the expression not essential to every expres-
sion of the idea, system, process, procedure, or method, the decisionmaker must focus
on whether those expressive elements, taken together, are a substantial part of the
allegedly copyrightable work.
Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 211.
85. 740 F. Supp. 37.
86. 799 F. Supp. 203.
87. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 706-12.
88. Id. at 706-07. The court stated that "any given work may consist of a mixture of
"numerous ideas and expressions". Id. at 707 (citations omitted). The process involves the
isolation of each level of abstraction of the program. Id. With the least amount of abstrac-
tion, the program "may be thought of in its entirety as a set of individual instructions." Id.
At the highest level of abstraction, "one is left with nothing but the ultimate function of the
program." Id. The goal of abstraction is to "map each of the designer's steps in the opposite
order in which they were taken during the program's creation." Id.
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of abstraction."" At each level, the structural parts that become
included are examined to determine if they are ideas, expression or
are unprotected expression (due to the bars listed above).90 The
third step requires "comparison" of the different non-literal pro-
tectable expressions that are selected during the "filtration" step.91
The "comparison" focuses on whether those protectable expres-
sions selected in the "filtration" process are substantially similar in
the original and new work.92 While this test appears unique from
the other test outlined, the Lotus v. Borland court determined that
this test is functionally equivalent to the test forwarded in that
case. 3 It seems clear that even from the short description pro-
vided, the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test is a very difficult
test to comprehend and apply. To use the test, a court would re-
quire a significant understanding of software development method-
ologies and techniques. For this reason, it seems apparent that this
test could likely be misunderstood and misapplied. Therefore, this
test would not be appropriate to adopt as a standard test for deter-
mining copyrightability or substantial similarity.
CONCLUSION/PROPOSAL
It is apparent that the tests proffered to date either fail to ade-
quately address the bars to copyright protection or are difficult to
synthesize. The goal of this analysis is to provide a test that is easy
to apply yet is equitable, encompasses all required issues and is in
keeping with the decisions in prior cases. The test proposed con-
sists of four parts and reverses the order with which past copyright
analysis of user interfaces or non-literal aspects of computer pro-
grams were performed.
89. Id. at 707. This step's purpose is to define the "scope of plaintiff's copyright." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 710-11.
92. Id. at 710.
93. Lotus v. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 211-12. The court stated:
I conclude that the standard for determining copyrightability . . .is compatible
with the abstraction-filtration portion of the Second Circuit's test. The Second Cir-
cuit founded its abstraction step on the opinions of Judge Learned Hand that were
also the foundation of the first set of the copyrightability test ... The second step of
that copyrightability test parallels the Second Circuit's "filtration" step.
The third step of the Second Circuit test, "comparison", serves two functions. The
first concerns the issue addressed in the third step of the "copyrightability" test I
have tentatively adopted for this case - whether the expressive elements of the al-
legedly copyrightable work are a substantial part of it. I conclude that in this respect
the two tests are compatible substantively though different in methodology.
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Comments
The first step in the analysis is to perform a "look and feel"
analysis to determine if the works are in fact similar. The two
works would be viewed side by side to determine if they look simi-
lar. The comparison would require the fact finder to look not only
at the screen displays, but also at a variety of other non-literal as-
pects of the program. This step would include a review of the flows
of the programs to determine if the primary "functionalities" and
purposes of the programs are the same and are achieved in the
same way. Additionally, such aspects as menu or command syntax
and screen layout shQuld be considered.
If the programs are deemed similar, then the fact finder would
next list those discrete non-literal components of the work that
caused the fact finder to consider the works to be similar. As in the
first step, the fact finder should not only list similarities in appear-
ance, but should also list such aspects as program flow. To compile
the list, the fact finder need only describe the appearance or action
that is found to be similar. No discussion as to programming tech-
nique or program structure is required or expected.
The third step would be to determine if any or all of the listed
elements are barred from copyright protection due to one of the
previously mentioned bars. An element in the list that is found not
to be copyrightable would be removed from the list. This step re-
quires the fact finder to employ expert assistance to determine
whether a listed element falls within the realm of one of the bars.
The resulting list then would be used in the fourth step, which
then would view the works again. This review would require a side-
by-side comparison of the works both as a whole and of those ele-
ments contained, in the list created in the third step. The court
could then determine if those elements still remaining in the de-
fendant's work, when compared to the plaintiff's work as a whole,
would cause the works to be considered substantially similar. In
addition, the court could decide if those elements in the list (cre-
ated in the third step) are copyrightable expressions and thus
infringed.
The advantage of this test. is fourfold. First, the test is clear and
easy to understand. A number of the tests cited are difficult to un-
derstand, let alone apply.9' For any test to be adopted as the stan-
dard, it must be of a form that is easily comprehended not only by
the courts but by those who require notice. Further, if a test is
unclear or difficult to understand, then the possibility of error in-
94. See notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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creases. Second, the test is concise and can be accomplished with
less effort than other tests cited. A number of the recent tests for-
warded appear to be quite tedious and time consuming. 5 The
practical effect of applying any test that requires excessive effort or
time to apply is to increase the likelihood of error. Third, the test
is complete. A number of tests cited fail to consider relevant fac-
tors, such as accepted bars to copyright protection, when determin-
ing whether a work is copyrightable and whether the copyright has
been infringed." To fail to address all relevant factors could lead
to improperly assigning original authorship to works. Fourth, the
test is compatible with trends evidenced in recent cases. Reviewing
the court decisions in a number of recent cases cited, if this test
had been applied to those cases, not only could the courts have
arrived at the same result, but the test would be in keeping with
the direction of the various courts' thinking.
John Houston
95. See notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
96. See notes 38-42, 87-89 and accompanying text.
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